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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ELLEN JULIA BROOKE,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45407
Ada County Case No.
CR-01-2016-41233

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Brooke failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, upon her guilty plea to felony leaving the
scene of an injury accident?

Brooke Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Brooke pled guilty to felony leaving the scene of an injury accident and misdemeanor
DUI and the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, for
leaving the scene of an injury accident and a concurrent 365-day jail sentence for misdemeanor
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DUI. (R., pp.104-07.) Brooke filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.108-10.)
Brooke asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence and by declining to place her on probation, in light of her difficult childhood,
amenability to treatment, support of family and friends, employment capacity, and purported
acceptance of responsibility. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-9.) Brooke has failed to establish an abuse
of discretion.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
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146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
A trial court's decision regarding whether imprisonment or probation is appropriate is
within its discretion. State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002)
(citations omitted); I.C. § 19-2601(4). The goal of probation is to foster the probationer's
rehabilitation while protecting public safety. State v. Cheatham, 159 Idaho 856, ___, 367 P.3d
251, 253 (Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted). A decision to deny probation will not be deemed
an abuse of discretion if it is consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521. Id. (citing
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1982)). Pursuant to I.C. § 192521(1):
The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime
without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the
defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of
the public because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime; or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to
the defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons
in the community; or
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
I.C. § 19-2521(1).
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The maximum prison sentence for felony leaving the scene of an injury accident is five
years. I.C. § 18-8007(2). The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one
year fixed, which falls within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.104-07.) Brooke’s sentence is not
excessive, nor is she a viable candidate for probation, in light of her decisions to endanger others
by driving while intoxicated and her minimization of her substance abuse issues.
Brooke’s criminal record demonstrates her disregard for the law and the well-being of
others. Brooke has accumulated prior felony convictions for possession of a dangerous drug,
conspiracy to manufacture a dangerous drug, and two counts of possession of a controlled
substance. (PSI, pp.5-6.) Brooke also has misdemeanor convictions for petit theft, driving
without privileges, carrying a concealed weapon without a license, and placing debris on
public/private property. (PSI, pp.5-7.) After she was convicted of possessing a controlled
substance in April 200, Brooke was sentenced to a period of retained jurisdiction and,
afterwards, was released to probation. (PSI, pp.7-8.) Approximately one year later, Brooke was
alleged to have violated the terms of her probation by being “terminated” from Women’s Issues
Group, being removed from Vocational Rehabilitation program, failing to pay costs of
supervision, failing to attend individual counseling sessions, moving from her approved
residence, and failing to report to her probation officer. (PSI, p.8.) While those allegations were
pending, Brooke was again charged with possession of a controlled substance after police found
methamphetamine in her car following a “one vehicle rollover” in which Brooke and her two
young children were involved. (PSI, p.8.) Brooke’s probation was subsequently revoked and
she was sentenced to prison in both possession cases. (PSI, p.8.)
Although Brooke participated in numerous classes and programs while incarcerated and
maintained sobriety for a period of time following her release (PSI, pp.7-8), she was ultimately
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unable to sustain any rehabilitative progress she had made. In this case, Brooke drove while
intoxicated and struck a parked car, injuring a woman who was “standing outside the vehicle
trying to put her child in the back seat.” (PSI, p.3.) When Brooke struck the victim’s vehicle,
“that vehicle ‘moved forward, causing [the victim] to strike her head on the car.’” (PSI, p.3.)
Brooke failed to stop after hitting the vehicle, but was pursued by onlookers who eventually “got
her to stop.” (PSI, p.3.) Brooke claimed she did not realize she was drunk when made the
decision to drive; however, a breath alcohol test showed she had a BAC of .322/.323. (PSI, pp.34.) Brooke’s difficult childhood, community support, and employment capacity do not outweigh
the seriousness of the offense or her demonstrated failures to be rehabilitated or deterred despite
prior incarceration and treatment opportunities.
At sentencing, the state addressed the seriousness of the offense, Brooke’s attempts to
minimize her criminal behavior, and the risk she poses to society. (8/4/17 Tr., p.24, L.23 – p.28,
L.3 (Appendix A).)

The district court subsequently articulated the correct legal standards

applicable to its decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Brooke’s sentence. (8/4/17
Tr., p.32, L.1 – p.36, L.11 (Appendix B).) The district court concluded, “It is a very serious
incident. It warrants a significant punishment.” (8/4/17 Tr., p.35, L.23-24.) The state submits
that Brooke has failed to establish that her sentence is excessive or that the district court abused
its discretion by declining to place her on probation, for reasons more fully set forth in the
attached excerpts of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on
appeal. (Appendices A and B.)
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Brooke’s conviction and sentence.

DATED this 21st day of February, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of February, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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BOISE, IDAHO
August 4, 2017, 3:43 p.m.

1
2

1 opportunity to review the presentence
2 investigation?
3
MR. LORELLO: Yes, Judge.

3

1HE COURT: Let's take up State versus
Ellen Brooke, Case No. CR0 I- I6-41233. Ms. Brooke
is present out of custody. She is represented by
Mr. Lorello. The state is represented by
Ms. Higbee. We're here today for sentencing.
On May 26, the defendant pleaded guilty
to two crimes, one, leaving the scene ofan injury
accident, and then also a misdemeanor excessive
driving under the influence charge.
She entered those pleas under a plea
agreement that called for the state on the
leaving-the-scene charge to cap its recommendation
at a five-year prison sentence consisting of three
years fixed followed by two years indeterminate.
TI1e state reserved the right to recommend outright
imposition of that prison sentence.
Counsel, is there any legal cause why
judgment should not be pronounced against the
defendant today?
MR. LORELLO: No, Your Honor.
MS. HIGBEE None known, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Have counsel had a full
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MS. HIGBEE: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Brooke, have you read it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Are there any deficiencies or
errors in it that either side would like to bring
to my attention?
MR. LORELLO: No, Your Honor.
MS. HIGBEE: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Does either side contend
there should be any additional investigation or
any additional evaluation of the defendant before
sentencing?
MR. LORELLO: No, Judge.
MS. HIGBEE: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: ls there a restitution claim,
Ms. Higby?
MS. HIGBEE: No, Your Honor. The state is
not seeking restitution in the criminal case.
THE COURT: All right. That's fine.
Any evidence or just argument?
MR. LORELLO: Just argument, Judge.
MS. HIGBEE: Just argument, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Higbee.
MS. HlGBEE: And, Your Honor, just for the
court's information, the victim Ms. Lucich is
present in the courtroom. My understanding is
that she does not desire to give further impact
statement other than what was provided in the PSI.
THE COURT: Sounds fine.
MS. HIGBEE: Your Honor, the state is going
to ask you to follow the plea agreement in this
case. The state is going to recommend a judgment
of conviction. The state is going to ask this
court to impose a five-year sentence with three
years fixed followed by two indeterminate and that
the cou1t, in fact, impose that sentence. The
state is going to ask for court costs, leave a
fine in the court's discretion.
As I indicated, the state is not
seeking restitution in the criminal case. The
state is going to ask for a one-year absolute
driver's license suspension as far as the
Department of Transportation can suspend the
defendant's license as far as the
leaving-the-scene charge, but as for the excessive
DUI, that would be a one-year absolute suspension.
As for the DUI count, the state is
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1 going to ask that either credit be imposed
2 concurrent with a prison sentence obviously. The
3 state is also going to ask for a no-contact order
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with no exceptions with the victim in this case in
crime.
THE COURT: Other than the fact that the
incident occurred, was there any contact between
Ms. Brooke and the alleged victim outside of this
accident?
MS. HIGBEE: No, not that I know of. I
believe a no-contact order has been in place and
if not -THE COURT: It's just kind of a weird
situation for a no-contact order in that there's
no reason to think that any contact would be in
the offing, I would think.
MS. HTGBEE: And true. I don't anticipate
there to be any sort of no-contact -- or any sort
of contact between the defendant and the victim in
this case. I think other than this one incident,
they otherwise don't know each other.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. HlGBEE: As the court is aware,
Ms. Brooke has an extensive criminal history. By
my count she has four felony convictions, this
1 (Pages 21 to 24)
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drugs. They're both in the same case, but two
felony convictions in 1990 out of the state of
Arizona. ln Idaho she has a possession of
controlled substance conviction in the year 2000.
She did a rider in that case. She had had
probation, and eventually that sentence was
imposed and she was sent to prison when she picked
up her second possession ofa controlled substance
case in 2002. That sentence with two years fixed,
and three indeterminate was imposed.
She also has misdemeanor offenses for
carrying a canceled weapon in 2000, petty theft
and driving without privileges and a littering
offense as well.
This was and is a very serious crime.
On December 5 of 2015, the defendant had been
drinking. She got behind the wheel of her
vehicle, and in doing so, she ran into the
victim's parked vehicle, as she was at her son's
school picking her son up. She had her young
daughter in the vehicle as well.
Ms. Lucich was outside of the vehicle,
and her daughter was not restrained in her parked
vehicle, was getting out of the car seat ready to
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her vehicle causing significant damage to her
vehicle as well as causing
Ms. Lucich to be propelled forward and strike her
vehicle, causing her to suffer some it~uries as a
result of that.
She also reported that her minor child
that was inside the vehicle unrestrained also
suffered some bruising, and that according to the
victim impact statement, this has had a
significant impact not only on Ms. Lucich but her
two minor children as well and continues still to
today.
The criminal history of Ms. Brooke is
concerning. Fortunately for her in this case,
there were not more serious injuries. The
defendant has been on felony supervision. She has
failed to comply with the terms of her treatment.
She did complete the rider program. However,
ultimately she continued to use drugs when she was
on probation, and it resulted in a prison
sentence.
While on pretrial release in this case,
there have been some concerns with her compliance.
Although they came in the form of dilute and a
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1 tamper with the SCRAM unit, raises some concerns

1 in this case, that she presents a danger to the
2 community and that future incarceration and prison
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that she continues to have an issue with alcohol.
In the PSI, the state is concerned that
she minimizes her alcohol abuse issues. The BAC
in this case was extremely high, a .322, .323,
four times the legal limit. And I'm concerned,
and I don't necessarily believe her version that
when this occurred, that she was unknowingly
served multiple alcoholic beverages to the point
that she became that intoxicated.
I think she minimizes her alcohol use.
I think she doesn't see the seriousness and the
consequences of that, and I'm concerned by her
thinking errors in that situation with regard to
that.
Her BAC was high which suggests that
she is an experienced drinker to get to that level
of a blood alcohol content. I'm concerned that
she lacks some accountability for her actions that
day. The GAIN evaluation I think was extremely
low due to her minimization.
I disagree with the PSI recommendation
and feel that based on her prior criminal history,
her prior performance on probation, her pretrial
release issues, her extremely dangerous behavior

3 is warranted and appropriate. Thank you.
4
T HE COURT: All right. Thank you,

5 Ms. Higbee.
6
7
8

Mr. Lorello, your argument.

MR. LORELLO: Thank you, Judge.
As is typically the case, it's just a

9 matter of the lens that you look through things.
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And certainly I understand the state's position,
and before I talk about some of the nice things
about Ellen, I think it bears mention how lucky
she is that it's just a leaving the scene of an
accident case.
The BAC was really high. It was
obviously traumatic for these folks that she ran
into at the time, and, but for the grace of God,
it could have turned a lot different. And so
Ellen understands this. There's no way to look at
what happened and sort of gloss it over and sort
of -- I think she fully understands how risky her
behavior was and sort of the real magnitude of the
harm that could have occurred.
And in my view in looking at these
facts with all of the other things in the
2
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1 presentence report, it's really the incident
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itself which is the most concerning, the BAC and
the car crash. And so I don't want to minimize
what happened and the effects that it might have
had on the victims, and I don't think Ellen does
either. I think she understands that it was a
very close call, and it wasn't even really a close
call. It could have been a lot worse I guess is
what I was going to say.
But that being said, she has a
significant criminal history, but as near as I can
tell, the last charge she has was over ten years
ago. I mean, the felonies were going on 30 years
ago, and at some point when does Ms. Brooke get to
wipe her slate clean for that prior conduct? And
the prior felonies were completely different than
this kind ofstuff.
So not suggesting to excuse it all, but
at some point Ms. Brooke was doing pretty well for
a long time, and she is doing well. Pretrial
release violations, they were ab dilutes. There
was one minor issue with her SCRAM, and so the
state is using that as an area of concern.
I would like to point out to the court
that she has been on pretrial release the entire
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1 time and hasn't tested positive once, hasn't been
2 prone to miss tests.
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We would have seen a motion to revoke
bond if she was really doing poorly. And so while
the state's view is the glass is half empty, 1
would view it as a glass that is half full. Ms.
Brooke does do pretty wel I and seems to sort of
realize the gravity of her choices, and she hasn't
been drinking or at least she hasn't been testing
positive. And so it shows that she can do well on
probation.
She is a hard worker. She is working
at Home Depot now. She has been there for two
months. She had to switch jobs, and she has been
promoted, and she has got a full-time job and she
is being productive.
And so that leaves us with what to do
with Ms. Brooke. And she is very hopeful that the
coutt will consider placing her on probation. She
is productive. She can stay out of trouble. What
she did was dangerous. And so it's difficult.
That's why the court sits up there and has to make
a difficult choice.
And it's easy to say the best way to
keep Ellen out of trouble is just to lock her up.
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1 That's the easy choice, but that's not why we're
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here. That's not why we've read presentence
reports and agonize over things like this.
I think that her perfonnance on
pretrial release and the fact that she sort of
turned her life around shows that she could be
successful, and l think that she deserves the
oppo1tunity to do it.
If the court is really concerned, there
are other ways to make sure that Ellen doesn't
drink and drive. Probation, suspend her driver's
license for a longer period of time absolutely,
keep her out from behind the wheel. There are
other things that the court with all its
creativity and all the tools that it has to make
sure that Ellen doesn't drive.
But I don't think you need to lock her
up to protect society. 1 don't think her prior
criminal history suggests that she needs to be
locked up for that. And so, Judge, that's what we
would ask the cow1 to do today.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lorello.
Ms. Brooke, would you like to make a
statement?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
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1
THE COURT: That's fine. You're not
2 obligated to do so.
3
I have, of course, read the presentence
4 investigation in your case. I'm well aware of the
5 four objectives of criminal sentencing that Idaho
6 law directs me to consider in every case. First
7 and foremost among them is protection of the
8 community, and that's a factor that tends to weigh
9 heavily in cases that have driving under the
10 influence element to them as this one does; also
11 rehabilitation of the defendant, punishment, and
12 deterrence.
13
Here we have a very concerning
14 incident, a scary incident, in which the defendant
15 with a very high blood-alcohol concentration, just
16 over four times the legal limit, while driving
1 7 near a preschool wound up hitting a parked car,
18 injuring a mother, Ms. Lucich, while she is
19 picking up her five-year-old daughter.
20
The daughter is in the back of the car,
21 sustains at least some bruising, and Ms. Lucich
22 herself is somewhat worse than that; a concussion,
23 headaches, lingering problems that have resulted
24 from that. It seems as though from her victim
25 impact statement that was part of the presentence
3
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1

investigation that the aftermath of the incident

2 has made regular life more overwhelming and

3 difficult than it was before.
4
So certainly there has been a real
5 impact on a real person, real people here, and
6 that's undoubtedly very regrettable. And this is
7 why we have driving under the influence laws that
8 require time in custody as a punishment for the
9 offense lo try to stamp out this kind of dangerous
10 behavior that needlessly hurts people.
11
It's important to consider in every
12 case I think not just the offense itself but the
13 person who committed it and her life history,
14 circumstances, and background.
15
Now, Ms. Brooke, as has been mentioned,
16 does have a significant criminal record leading up
1 7 to this point. She has possession of a controlled
18 substance convictions, felony convictions, in
19 three prior instances. They arc old. They're
20 dated. One dates back to I believe 1990 in
21 Arizona. The defendant was sentenced to probation
22 in the other case.
23
In 2000, another conviction. That was
24 here, and the defendant received a rider. And
25 then a third, one in 2001 that resulted in the
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1 defendant being sent to prison.
2
She was released, as I understand
3 things, from prison in 2003 and has not really had

4 trouble with the law since then until this very
5 serious incident here.
6
Now, part of my concern and the
7 difficulty I have with the case is Ms. Brooke
8 is -- her explanation for what happened, how she
9 became this drunk and wound up on the roadway, is
10 troubling in that it borders on implausible when
11 she acknowledges drinking one shot of her own
12 accord and then contends that the rest of whatever
13 she drank that day in the way of alcoholic
14 beverages was really done without her knowing it.
15
She was being bought drinks by a man in
16 the bar that she says she believed were just
1 7 Cokes. And it's difficult to accept the idea that
18 by taste alone the defendant wouldn't have been
19 able to distinguish between Cokes and Cokes laced
20 with enough alcohol the get her as drunk as she
21 was, to be in a bar getting -- wind up that drunk
22 at a time of day where you're in the school cycle.
23 This was obviously -- this happened, as I
24 understand things, around 4 o'clock.
25
That's very concerning as well. Very
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1 high blood-alcohol content where the defendant

1 to benefit from substance abuse treatment that, of

2 evidently still felt it was appropriate to drive,

2 course, could be available in the community but

3 certainly suggests that she has a pretty high
4 tolerance for alcohol.
5
I don't know, but it's all a very
6 concerning incident that is suggestive of a
7 significant alcohol problem.
8
Now, the defendant, after some initial
9 trouble on pretrial release with a number of
10 dilute samples that couldn't be tested, and one
11 initial early-on tamper reading with her SCRAM
12 device has done well.
13
She has been on pretrial release for a
14 substantial period of time. Some of these factors
15 I suppose contributed to the PSI riders'
16 suggestion that the defendant was an appropriate
1 7 candidate for probation, although the PSI rider
18 indicated that the incident itself was serious
19 enough that the PSI rider expressed, I suppose,
20 what amounts to understanding that some outcome
21 other than probation may not be in the offing
22 here.
23
It is a very serious incident. It
2 4 warrants a significant punishment. The defendant
2 5 would seem to benefit from or to be in a position

3 would also be something to be provided in custody
4 here.
5
Given her overall criminal history,
6 which is serious as I have noted, and given the
7 seriousness of it, it does seem to me that
8 imposition of a prison sentence is appropriate.
9 That said, I do not believe that a sentence that
10 contains as much fixed time as the state is
1 1 recommending here is appropriate.
12
So all of that said, Ms. Brooke, on
13 your plea of guilty to the crime of leaving the
14 scene, I find you guilty. I will sentence you to
15 the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction
16 under the unified sentence law of the State of
1 7 Idaho for an aggregate term of five years. I'll
18 specify a minimum period of confinement of one
19 year and a subsequent indeterminate period of
20 confinement of four years.
21
You'll be remanded to the custody of
22 the sheriff of this county to be delivered to the
23 proper agent of the state Board of Correction in
2 4 execution of this sentence.
25
You'll have five days of credit for
4 ( Pages 33 to 36)

Tucker & Associates, 605 W. Fort St ., Bo ise , ID 83702 (208) 345-3704

APPENDIX B – Page 2

